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Introduction
During my Junior year, Spring Semester at DePauw University, I took an Honors
Course called BioEthics. In this course, we discussed many cases where decision
making, in a medical context, is very hard and how using the principles of ethics can
make the decision making process a bit easier when dealing with emotion-driven
situations/cases. Towards the end of the semester, I wrote a paper about ethics in
medical decision making. Since I am a Computer Science major, I began to research if
Computer Science had any connection with medicine and if it did then how would ethics
be involved? During my research, I learned about medical devices which are any
technologies that are used in medicine, but specifically pacemakers. A pacemaker is a
device that physicians use to monitor a patient’s heartbeat. During that time, my
grandmother was admitted into a hospital and I found out that she had a pacemaker
installed in order to monitor her heart's beat. However, during my research, I found out
that pacemakers were vulnerable to hacking and that a security expert by the name of
Barnaby Jack discovered how to hack a pacemaker. He was supposed to make a
presentation on the security issues of pacemakers at a Black Hat conference, a well
known hacking conference, but passed away days before the conference. After finding
out that it is possible to hack into a pacemaker and that there is a possibility that the
hacker can send a shock through the pacemaker that is connected to the heart, it
terrified me and it only made me more motivated to learn more about this medical
device. Through my experience with finding out that my grandmother had a pacemaker
and researching about the pacemaker, I realized that I wanted more people to know
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about these security issues and also be able to help in fixing these vulnerabilities so that
patients are not at risk of being hurt or even killed from the same medicals devices that
are supposed to aid the patients. It was through my individual interest in pacemakers
that led me to learn about the massive dangers of cybersecurity and how it is heavily
related to medicine. Not only are there dangers with the use of some medical devices
but there are also other vectors by which attackers can do some harm.
There have been many cases of hackers successfully attacking hospitals and it
has resulted in millions of dollars in monetary loss. As of 2019, there has been a 25
billion dollar estimated loss in the healthcare industry due to cyberattacks. As well as,
on average there are about 113,491 sensitive patient files that are lost from
cybersecurity attacks (Sobers, 2020). Given our current times of pursuing technological
innovation and heavily relying on technology, the level of danger only increases when
companies and innovators create products that are driven by monetary benefit,
functionality, and when not much concern is given towards the security of their products.
The purpose of this thesis is to not only bring to light some of the attacks that
hackers can perform on medical devices, but also attacks that are present in the context
of medicine. By analyzing certain attacks that hackers are capable of doing, I want to
bring to attention the lack of security in many hospitals and medical devices so that both
the general public and manufacturers are aware of the need for better security. This
thesis will first give an overview of the principle of ethics, security flaws of medical
devices (Internet of Things devices), flaws in hospital networks, and lastly discuss the
weakest link of healthcare security, the human factor.
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Ethics
Cybersecurity in healthcare is not a new topic as there are constant articles and
news reports made on cases where there has been a hacker who has stolen some
information or any other similar case from which a hacker is attempting to get some
benefit. Most common attacks are usually ransomware attacks where a hacker steals
some information and the hacker asks for money in return for that stolen information.
However, the ways from which a hacker is able to cause harm is vast and not all of
these forms of attacks are known. For example, attacks on medical devices such as
pacemakers. The easiest way to not risk the chance of a cyber attack would be to not
use these sorts of devices, but this is not an option that patients who rely on them have.
Ironically, it is these same devices that are helping some patients that have the potential
to kill them and so the question is whether it is correct to administer such devices when
there is always a possibility to harm the patients? Hence I introduce these ethical
principles as a guide to discuss if some of these devices are ethically correct to
administer to patients. Furthermore not only explore this question but also see if there is
a way to add security measures on such devices or other vectors of attacks so that
patients can continue to use medical devices and other services with ease in mind that
there isn’t some other source of harm that can come their way.
The basis for ethics, particularly bioethics in the context of medicine, is to lay
down a framework for better decision making on what should be done when taking care
of people. Bioethics tackles questions concerning basic human values such as humans’
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rights to life, the right or wrongs of cases in hospitals, medical technology, medicine,
physicians, and about the responsibility that hospitals have for the life and health of their
patients (Disabled World, 2019). Within bioethics, there are four principles that form the
framework for moral reasoning. In many cases involving healthcare institutions, there
can be a lot of situations where moral conflicts can occur and it is hard to decide on a
certain action to take. By using these four principles, it is easier to not make
emotion-driven decisions that could not be at the best benefit of the patient. One of the
main values behind these principles is human life. Meaning that when dealing with
decision making, the patient’s benefit is the first priority. That is why I suggest having
these principles as a common ground in order to address issues within the healthcare
industry.
The four principles of bioethics consist of Nonmaleficence, Justice, Beneficence,
and Autonomy. Nonmaleficence meaning that physicians should not cause patients
harm or at the very least the harm received should not outweigh the patient’s benefit
from going through a certain procedure. For example, if the patient is in a life or death
situation and doing surgery could save their life then that surgery has a greater benefit
to the patient than the pain from getting the surgery. Hence under the principle of
Nonmaleficence, it is ethically correct for the patient to go through the surgery. Justice
meaning that benefits and risks should be fairly distributed. This means that patients
who are in similar situations should be treated the same. Beneficence means that
physicians should consider the risks and benefits before conducting a procedure as the
patient’s benefit is the sole purpose of considering a certain procedure. Lastly,
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Autonomy means that physicians should respect the decision of the patient. Allowing
patients to make their own decisions on the consensus that the patients are well
informed about their situation. In the case of Autonomy, it is up to the patient to decide
what they want to do regardless of what the physician recommends as it is their
autonomous right to decide for themselves. By using these principles as a foundation, I
will explain why certain systems and devices being used need more secure and suggest
some changes that should be made to better manage healthcare issues (Disabled
World, 2019).
First, I want to bring to light some of the most concerning case studies in
medicine that involve the use of modern technology for the purposes of diagnosis and
treatment. There are multiple types of security attacks that can occur in the medical field
that fall under Data Security (also known as Information Security), Hardware Security,
Network Security, and many more. Data Security consists of a list of practices that are
done for the purpose of keeping data secure from unauthorized individuals during both
the transmission of data and while data is stored (Fruhllnger). Hardware Security,
however, focuses on the protection of systems, at the physical layer, from vulnerabilities
(Levine and Pipikaite). I would like to first separate the types into two main branches to
analyze healthcare vulnerabilities. Data Security and Hardware Security. Data Security
in medicine can be described as the field that examines security flaws in the
management of patient data. However, it is very possible that hardware security flaws
can lead to patient information being leaked but the approaches of these attacks are
different. When strictly speaking about Data Security I am referring to the security in the
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hospital's infrastructure such as the version of the Operating System being used,
mal-practices from physicians using certain technology in an insecure manner, or the
access privileges given to employees working at hospitals. In comparison to Hardware
Security which is concerning the security flaws in Internet of Things devices (IoT
devices), devices that interact with networks by sending or receiving data, such as
pacemakers, MRI machines which are devices used to develop medical images of a
patient’s body, and other types of medical devices. Another important sector in security
that I want to discuss is Network Security as it affects both hardware security and data
security since they both involve the usage of networks. Network security can be
described as techniques used to protect the usability and integrity of networks and data
(Cisco, 2020). For example, a medical device such as an MRI (IoT device) machine is
connected to the network so that medical images can be sent and stored in some
database so that physicians are able to look at the patient records. In order for this
process to work, the data transferred has to be connected to some network so that the
data can be both stored in the database and also so that physicians are able to get
access to this data. However, by dividing Hardware security and Data Security, we can
better analyze certain attacks by identifying vulnerabilities found within hardware
systems and IoT devices and see how in combination with networks these
vulnerabilities can create bigger vectors of attack. Furthermore, I will bring to light this
common theme in medical device development where the functionality,
user-friendliness, or usability of the product seems to outweigh the number of security
features invested to make the medical devices safe.
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The Internet of Things is a bit tricky to make more secure as this involves not just
the hospitals but also the manufacturing companies that create the devices. In order to
be able to make these devices more secure, there needs to be a collaborative effort
from both the hospitals and the companies involved in the production of the devices.
Ultimately, by analyzing these medical devices I want to bring to attention some of the
grave dangers that are present in the use of such medical devices and yet are still being
used on patients.
Security of IoT Devices
The three main sources of security errors are with the device’s design, software
risks/vulnerabilities, and human factors that make the Internet of Things devices less
secure (Aram, Rouzbeh, Pasero, and Chouikha, 47). There are many devices that are
designed in a way that hinders users from not being able to access certain data from
the devices. For example, if devices such as implants were encrypted then doctors
would not be able to get quick access to the patient data which is essential in
emergency situations. Software risks arise from the architectural designs of the IoT
devices and also how engineers create the device. Lastly is the human factor which
arises from not handling the devices properly. Therefore the risk of security errors is
rather large and in conjunction with the IoT architecture design, there are even more
forms of attack that can be performed.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices typically use confidential data. This can be
information that is found in factories, businesses, or even health monitoring devices.
There are a variety of devices that are used for many different services, but they share
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some generic architecture for the functionality of the IoT devices. While some devices
may implement a variance of this general architecture, they are usually based on the
same design model. Therefore, we will look at a general architecture design, analyze
the purposes of its different layers, and then explain why there can be some flaws in the
way the design was constructed.

Figure 1: Five Layer IoT Device Architecture (Sethi and Sarangi, 2017)

This generic Internet of Things architecture in Figure 1 is composed of the
Application Layer, Network Layer, and the Perception Layer. However, due to the fact
that IoT devices are very diverse and heterogeneous, we need to introduce another
layer called the Middleware layer which provides extra services such as processing,
analyzing, and storing massive amounts of data that is given by the Network Layer
(Sethi and Sarangi, 2017). Also, if the IoT device is being used in a business setting or
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on a bigger scale then there is also the usage of the Business Layer which handles the
overall management of a multitude of IoT devices used in a company/organization.
However, since the Business layer is concerning the management of a multitude of
devices, we will focus on the other layers as they focus on the individual devices’
components. In the following sections, we will analyze each of the layers starting from
the bottom at the Perception layer up to the Application layer as the upper layers are
using the services that are provided by the Perception Later.
Briefly looking at the layers, the Perception Layer/physical devices uses sensors
for sensing and obtaining information. The second layer is the Network Layer which is
responsible for connecting devices and other servers via some network. It also collects
data from the perception layer and transmits it to the upper layers of the architecture.
Some of the issues that arise from this layer are information sharing and the
transmission of data. The third layer is the Middleware Level and this level is in charge
of linking the system to technologies such as databases, the cloud, and performs data
processing and storage. Some of the issues that arise from this level are handling
security in the database and in the cloud storage. Lastly, the Application Layer, which is
responsible for providing services to the user and also used to manage and process
data that is given by the middleware layer. Some of the issues that can occur in this
level involve the transfer of data and the access to confidential user data (Chen, Zhang,
Li, et al., 98-99).
Given that all of these flaws are present, we can begin to see just how dangerous
IoT devices can be if the architecture development of the IoT devices is not created with
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extreme care. Yet how is it that even with these amounts of errors, hospitals still use IoT
devices and depend heavily on them for managing patient data? Let’s dive deeper into
each layer to see all of the components within the layers and see how there is an array
of attacks that can be executed to infiltrate the different layers of IoT devices.

Perception Layer
Beginning from the bottom of the architecture, the Perception Layer is vulnerable
to attacks that target data transfer and other communications between networks. Within
this layer, there are many sensory technologies and identification technologies that are
used. These can be devices such as RFID tags which patients would have on their
wrist. These RFID tags help physicians by allowing physicians to just scan the tags and
be able to look up patient information. One of the attacks that can be directed to these
RFID tags is RF Jamming which is when attackers are able to destroy the
communication between the tag reader and the tag itself which hinders the physicians’
capability of looking up patient records by using the RFID tag. Another attack that RFID
tags are vulnerable is tag cloning which allows the attacker to make a replica of a tag.
This could be dangerous because if the attacker has an RFID reader it is possible to
gain access to user data if the RFID chip is not encrypted properly (Chen, Zhang, Li, et
al., 1
 02-103).
The perception layer uses sensor nodes to create communications between
technologies. A node is a device or a data point in a large network that serves as a
connecting point from some source to some other location. There are a variety of
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attacks that can take advantage of these sensor nodes to stop communication, but in
the context of medicine, one dangerous attack is called Sleep Deprivation Attack. This
form of attack is targeted on devices and nodes so that they cannot go into sleep mode.
The attack keeps the node busy so that the device cannot go into sleep mode. Meaning
that their battery life is drained over time of usage. While this may not sound so
threatening, when considering implantable devices that rely heavily on their ability to
have a battery life that lasts for at least two years, this can pose a grave danger as
devices such as pacemakers will run out of battery and a re-implantation will be needed.
In cases where the pacemaker is heavily relied on to monitor the patient's heart,
monitoring time will be lost in having to reimplant the patient; Assuming that the patient
is in a condition to go through the reimplantation surgery. Similarly with Insulin pumps,
which are devices that deliver insulin to the body to manage blood sugar levels, that are
implanted. High levels of blood sugar can be life-threatening and insulin pumps are
required. Hence in the case where the battery life dies, that immediate insulin release
from the pump will not be there and that can be the end of the patient when insulin is
needed immediately (Chen, Zhang, Li, et al.,1
 02-103).

Network Layer
In the Network Layer, the attacks can vary depending on the protocols that are
being used to create network connections/communications. The protocols that are
commonly used are Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Zigbee. Therefore, this layer can be the most
dangerous as there is a bigger array of attacks since each device in the network can be
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very different from each other. Meaning that it is harder to protect all devices in the
same fashion as they all have different vulnerabilities. That being said, one of the most
common types of attack are DoS/DDoS (denial of service)attacks which is when an
attacker sends multiple requests to a website which causes huge traffic and does not
allow users from being able to use a website’s services (Chen, Zhang, Li, et al.,
101-102).
For the purpose of this paper, I will look at the most commonly used protocol
being Wi-Fi to see what are some approaches to the exploitation of medical devices that
use these protocols. Network Security in Wi-Fi networks is achieved through the use of
encryption. There are two sectors in Wi-Fi security which are privacy and authentication
mechanisms. Privacy is the restriction of access to some network for users who are not
authorized. Authentication requires the inputting of credentials from users to get access
to the network. In Wi-Fi, encryption is a popular method to ensure privacy. To make it
easier to understand, I will use an example to explain how communication is done over
a network. When data is sent over a network there are two entities. One sends some
data and one receives that data. Let’s say that the sender wants to send some data to
the receiver without anyone else being able to see what that data is. This would require
some sort of encryption so that the data can be coded in a way that is not readable to
others. Once the receiver has gotten the data they need to be able to decrypt it and to
do so they would need to know how the encryption algorithm works. Typically what is
needed is some key to be able to decrypt the data. Imagine that the data is sent in a
box with a lock and in order to see the data you need to open the lock with some key.

Ordonez
14

The lock represents the encryption added on the data and the need for a key in the
algorithm represents the same key needed to open the lock to see the data inside.
However in order for both sides to be able to open and decrypt the data the key needs
to be known by both the sender and the receiver. This process of exchanging keys is
known as a handshake and this key then used for the encryption/decryption process.
One of the most common security tools is Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). WEP
is a security algorithm for the IEEE 802.11, a standard for information technology
telecommunications and information exchange created by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), wireless networks. IEEE has created many standards by
which engineers should follow. IEEE 802.11 was developed in 1999 as one of the
earliest wireless security protocols, but it was later found out that its encryption
algorithm could be decrypted. As well as other vulnerabilities such as hackers being
able to “redirect encrypted data to externally controlled IP (Internet Protocol) addresses
which is unique to any computer, laptop, or printer. An IP address can be thought of as
a street address which pinpoints to some location in the world except instead of a home
being at the address, the IP locates a specific machine. Due to the number of
vulnerabilities that are present in WEP, this network protocol is not used anymore but
there are still some old routers that still use this as an encryption mechanism to have
“privacy” in their Wi-Fi network. This can occur in older companies or businesses who
have not updated their technology and if so they are vulnerable to attacks where the
data transfer can be easily grabbed and decrypted (Aram, Shirvani, et al. 47).
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After WEP was found insecure, WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) was created
to be more secure than WEP. WAP uses an encryption method called TKIP(temporal
key integrity). Essentially the algorithm would use some value, known as a key, which
dynamically changes as it is being used and provides better security as there would not
be a single key that could be used to access a network. However, there are also some
vulnerabilities found. Afterward, WPA2 was created which uses AES (advanced
encryption standard) which was thought to be so secure that even the government has
adopted this security protocol today. The AES algorithm is a symmetric-key algorithm
and that means that the same value key is used for both encrypting and decrypting of
data that passes through a network. As well as in 2018, the Wi-Fi Alliance announced
the release of WPA3 which replaces the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) exchange, which is how
keys are exchanged between two parties before the sending of any data. Instead with
Simultaneous Authentication of Equals, a new form of encryption that requires
password authentication before a connection can be made over a network. (Burke,
2018)
In 2018, there were some vulnerabilities that were found in WPA2 leading to
attack called Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK). KRACK attacks work by tricking the
victim into reusing a currently used key. In terms of the attack, that would mean that it
can be possible to decrypt all data that the victim transmits. What this means is that in
order to secure or guarantee the WPA2 is for the key to only be used once, but since
that is not the case, an attacker can abuse this vulnerability (Mathy and Frank, 2017).
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Just last year, 2019, a vulnerability was also found in WPA3 and this brought
forth the DragonBlood attack. The WPA3 was said to be so good that it was almost
impossible to break the password of the network. However, it was later found that “an
attacker within range of some victim, could get access to the password. The flaws in
WPA3 fall under two categories. One concerning downgrade attacks on devices that are
capable of using WPA3 and the second is concerning weaknesses in the Dragonfly
handshake (better known as Simultaneous Authentication of Equals or SAE) of WPA3.
The first category was found after discovering that it is possible to create a rogue
network and force clients to change from WPA3 to connecting to a rouge WPA2-only
network. Therefore, an attacker can then recover network passwords by using
techniques such as brute-force, a trial-and-error technique until the password is found.
As well as take advantage of any vulnerabilities that were found with WPA2. The
second category is a flaw with the Dragonfly handshake which is derived from the
algorithm used in order to authenticate the communication between two users. (Mathy
and Eyal, 2020)

Dragonfly Algorithm Idea:
for (counter = 1; counter < 256; counter++)
value = hash(pw, counter, add1, add2)
if value >= p
p = value(p−1)/q
return p
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Figure 2: Dragonfly Algorithm

The idea of this algorithm is that you have two addresses or destinations that
correspond to the users and then you have a shared password that will be encrypted
into a single value. This single value is denoted in Figure 2 as ‘value. Each user is to
input a common password and then the algorithm is run to allow communication access.
However, based on the information of the password and the two destination addresses,
it can affect the size of the encrypted value. If the encrypted value is greater than this ‘p’
value seen in Figure 2, a predefined value that is derived from a crypto group which is a
set of values used for encryption purposes, then the algorithm will be executed again.
This means that based on the size of the encrypted value, it will determine how many
iterations the algorithm must conduct before the connection is made. This can be taken
advantage of because depending on the time it takes for the connection, you can
analyze it to determine the size of the encrypted value. In combination with a spoofing
attack, an attack where communication from an unknown source is disguised as some
known source, an attacker could determine a client’s address. Since the encrypted
value is a combination of the password, counter, and the address, an attacker would
have the values to the counter based on the time it takes for the connection to
complete. As well as the addresses because of the spoofing attack. Once they have all
of this information then they can conduct a brute-force attack or some other attack to
crack passwords and then see if the encrypted values match. If they do then that means
that they have the password. This analysis of time and data gained from the
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implementation of some system is called a side-channel attack or a timing attack for this
case (Mathy and Eyal, 2020).

Middleware layer
In the Middleware layer, the attacks typically target the quality of service that is
provided and exploit user privacy. Some common attacks are SQL injection and
Flooding attack in Cloud. The most common attack is SQL injection which is when an
attacker inputs code, called SQL, that is used in the database. This can happen when
an attacker inputs code into the search bar of a website. The code is submitted to the
server where the code is then sent to the database. If that code works in the database
then the attacker can gain access to information that a user should not have access to.
This attack is not difficult to conduct but the results of a successful injection can be very
devastating. In the context of hospitals, this could mean accessing patients’ information.
Recently cloud computing has become more common and essentially it is data storage
that is available to users via the internet. Microsoft defines cloud computing as the
“delivery of computing services—including servers, storage, databases, networking,
software, analytics, and intelligence—over the Internet (“the cloud”) to offer faster
innovation, flexible resources, and economies of scale.” An example of cloud computing
is dropbox, which allows users to store data. While it does have many benefits, given
that this technology is still very new, many of the issues fall on how the developers use
this technology. Attacks such as Flood Attacks can occur when a DoS attack is done
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but onto a cloud service. Meaning that an attacker will send multiple requests to the
cloud which can hinder the quality of service (Chen, Zhang, Li, et al.,101).

Application Layer
Taking a deeper look at the application layer, the main form of attacks are those
that aim at getting access to sensitive data by exploiting vulnerabilities in the
application. The application can be in the form of a website on a browser or some app
on a device. Common attacks on these applications are code injections, authentication
attacks, and authorization attacks. Code injection is when an attacker injects some code
into the application such as, for example, inputting a script in the HTML code that
makes up a page on a website. This can be used to “steal data, get system control, and
to propagate worms.” Meaning that if successfully executed it is possible to not only
steal user data but also possible to shut down the entire application. Authentication and
Authorization issues are a big issue in IoT devices. Authentication is the requirement of
credentials from users to get access to a network. There are still many flaws in
providing total authentication and this happens because of “over-privileges” that allow
the device to have access to information that it should not have access to such as a
user’s private information. This means that if an attacker gets access to the device they
can get access to user information (Chen, Zhang, Li, et al., 99-100).
After considering the many ways that attackers can gain access to private data
and devices, it becomes very concerning as to the security of the devices. In the context
of medicines, these attacks are not directly life-threatening, but the side-products of
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such attacks can cause danger ranging from data loss to potential death. Given that this
IoT architecture we have discussed is just a general architecture, we need to look
deeper at individual IoT devices that are used in hospitals to understand where the
architecture plays a role in the specific device and also what are some specific attacks
that are concerned with that specific device. I will explain some risks of devices such as
insulin pumps, pacemakers, and MRI machines. As well as describe why they have
dangerous flaws, provide some suggestions as to how to better protect them, and why
manufacturers need to have security in mind when creating medical devices.

Brain Implants
One of the older forms of therapy for depression is known as Electroconvulsive
therapy. Doctors have used electricity to jolt brains out of depression for decades.
Electroconvulsive therapy was first introduced in the 1930s, but by the 1950s this
became a common treatment to fight depression. As this technique further developed,
its modern form has been implemented through the use of attaching tiny electrodes, an
electrical conductor by which electric current can pass, in the outer layer of the brain to
monitor for any seizures that might occur. With these electrodes, physicians are able to
shock the patient in the specific location of the brain where a certain seizure might occur
and be able to control that seizure. The doctors are also wanting to use this technique
for the purpose of inducing certain emotions on patients suffering from depression. This
would mean that if a patient is about to enter a depression crisis then with the zap of
these electrodes the emotions of sadness are zapped away. The research goal is to be
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able to create a brain-zapping implant. These implants are small implantable devices
that are able to both learn the brain’s language and be able to shock the individual when
depression begins to set in. (Laura 2019)
The Deep Brain Stimulation system (DBS) is the most common brain implant. It
consists of electrodes that are connected to wires running under the skin. The stimulator
(also called a pulse generator) has a battery, a processor, and a wireless
communication antenna to allow the transfer of data and also so that doctors can
program them. Meaning that there needs to be access given to the doctors. That is
done via a 'back-door' into the device. A 'back-door' allows doctors to have access to
the device in the case of medical emergencies where they need to be in control of the
implant. This means that if that 'back-door' exists, then there also exists a vulnerability
in the potential access of the implant via this access point. Now, what exactly can occur
if someone gets control of the device? Some of the possibilities include the attacker
inducing behavioral changes such as hypersexuality or pathological gambling by
stimulating parts of the brain involved with rewards learning to make the person act in
some manner. (Pycroft, 2016)
There are two different types of attacks that can occur in a cyber threat. Them
being blind attacks and a targeted attack. A blind attack is when an attacker requires no
specific information in order to perform the attack. In contrast to that of a targeted attack
where the attacker needs to know some specific information about an individual. If the
attacker is able to get personal data then the forms of attack can change. Potential brain
implant attacks that can arise from blind attacks consist of: inducing stimulations,
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draining implant batteries, inducing tissue damage, and information theft. Compared to
the potential brain implant attacks that can arise from targeted attacks which consists of
impairment of motor function, alteration of impulse control, modification of emotions,
inducing pain, and modification of the reward system. Given all of these approaches to
attack it would seem natural to impose security measures in the construction of these
implants so that cases like these will never happen, but that is actually not the case.
The issue arises that during security implementation on medical devices, it typically
results in the doctors having less control over the devices and they need full control in
cases of emergencies or being able to monitor their patients thoroughly (Pycroft,
Boccard, et al., 455).
There have been some secure implant designs that have been thought of but
there is a trade-off to consider. The security over the device and the specific
functionalities that are wanted in the device. In the article “Brainjacking: Implant Security
Issues in Invasive Neuromodulation”, there are some solutions that are considered with
explanations as to why these ideas are difficult to implement and have limitations in the
functionality such as the limitations of many IPGs(Implantable Pulse Generators). For
example, one of the new improvements that are wanted is for a longer range of wireless
communication. The newest IPGs, the portion of the implant that creates the shock
stimulations, use wireless communication protocols such as Bluetooth, but in the long
run manufacturers are considering using communication over transmission control
protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) which is another protocol by which network
communication can be conducted. The reason is that by doing so it will enable them to
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have remote control over data passed through the network and also be able to make
software updates for IPGs over the Internet. As well as, manufacturers want to change
from using machines to program the implants and use proprietary software that is on
consumers’ devices such as in their tablets and smartphones. Now the issue that arises
from proprietary software running on consumer devices is that it is harder for a security
analyst to get their hands on that so that means that they cannot help find security flaws
(Pycroft, Boccard, et al., 457).
In this same article, there were some security considerations such as the
usage of a Cloaker and shield to secure the communication from the implant to the
physician. Basically, a Cloaker and shield are external devices that provide an
additional layer of security between the implant and any other device that is trying to
connect to the implant. While this will increase security, it also requires the use of extra
external devices. As well as “require the inconvenience of carrying around additional
devices." Just from the word "Inconvenience", there is a clear dominance in the
importance of the functionality of a product over the security of the product. This is
where we can begin to see what is really important to the companies. Doing business to
sell their products in a more cost-efficient way rather than implementing security
protocols that need to be implemented so that there are no risks to causing any harm to
a patient (Pycroft, Boccard, et al., 458).
When considering the ethical implications of the inconvenience in having to carry
more instruments or the inconvenience in the usage of more money during development
to provide a secure infrastructure for the device, this is not ethically correct. Going back
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onto the principle of bioethics we can see how this clearly breaks Nonmaleficence, the
idea that physicians should not be causing any harm to the patients. While it may not be
the case that physicians are intentionally harming the patients as it can be very well
possible that they themselves do not know the dangers. There needs to be a universal
mindset change from just creating something that works and ensuring that every aspect
of the device is protected. Since cyberspace is still relatively new it is still not an urgent
point for companies to consider, but given the number of cases that have already
occurred in healthcare systems around the world, there need to be more security
measures put in place when creating new products. As we will see later, there are many
hacks that have already targeted the healthcare industry and it makes it very
questionable why there has not been much action taken to implement better security.

Pacemaker
A pacemaker is a device that is implanted into a patient’s chest or abdomen in
order to both help monitor a heart’s pulse and to control abnormalities in a patient’s
heartbeat. There are a variety of versions of pacemakers, but they all have similar
components. These being a battery, lead wires, and circuitry. The computation and
engineering of the pacemaker are built into the circuitry where the microprocessor is
able to run many processes based on event-driven situations received from the heart’s
pulses. In order to better understand the functionality of the pacemaker, I want to
explain both the circuitry and the battery components of the pacemaker as those are the
main components driving the pacemaker (How Products are Made, 2006).
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The battery’s primary function is to store enough energy to stimulate the heart
with a jolt of electricity. It also provides energy for the sensors and the timing devices. It
needs to also be able to generate about five volts of power, which is a little higher than
the amount needed to stimulate the heart. The insulated wires are then used to pass the
electricity from the battery to the heart and be able to stimulate the heart when needed.
However, since internal pacemakers are implanted inside the body, the battery needs to
be able to last for a long time so that there is no need to re-implant the pacemaker
often. The minimum battery life needed is four years. In addition to that, there needs to
be a way to accurately gauge the life-cycle of the battery so that the doctors can know
when they will need to change the battery (How Products are Made, 2006).
The circuitry is composed primarily of resistors, capacitors, diodes, and
semiconductors. However since microprocessors have become the standard control
circuits for pacemakers and other implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs), we need
to look into Processor-Based Implantable Pacemakers. A microprocessor is an
integrated circuit. Microprocessors are more advanced than older circuitry and this is
mainly because of the low amount of power that they consumed. That meant that the
longevity of the battery was now extended. These microprocessors also allow the use of
more complex algorithms and have also increased the data storage for the pacemaker.
An integrated circuit is a device where all functional blocks such as transistors are
fabricated on the same chip so that this small central processor is able to handle the
input and output control from the software programming to the hardware circuitry.
Basically, this microprocessor is a powerful chip that is able to process all the
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instructions needed to monitor and handle the responses to abnormalities in a patient’s
heart (Galla, 46).
These Processor-Based Implantable Pacemakers work in three different
operating modes. The first being able to run asynchronously(in real-time) and being
able to ignore any unwanted rhythm that can be made from other parts of the body that
is not the heart; known as VOO mode. Mode two being ‘Inhibited’. In this mode, the
pacemaker senses cardiac activity and waits until it senses that there is no further
cardiac activity to then deliver a stimulus. The last mode is called ‘Triggered’. This is
where the pacemaker senses activity and will send a stimulus in a certain desired way.
A very popular microprocessor that is being used is the MSP-430F1611 because of the
low level of power consumption which is essential for keeping the battery life past the
four-year minimum (Chede and Kulat, 49-51).
In terms of the programming involved to make the pacemaker work in the way
that it does, it is well designed. However the clear weak point of the pacemakers is if the
battery were to die. If an attacker were to successfully conduct an attack such as a
Sleep attack, it could deplenish the battery life of the pacemaker if not kill it completely.
Not only would it result in the patient’s heart not being monitored, but it would result in
the patient needing a re-implantation as the pacemaker is needed to keep constant
monitoring of their heartbeat in the case of an emergency. However, it is always
possible that during that window of time when the pacemaker battery is not working and
the reimplantation surgery is being scheduled, the patient could begin to have abnormal
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heartbeats. Given that the doctor is now able to monitor the heart during this time, that
could result in the patient potentially losing their life.
In 2012, an ethical hacker by the name of Barnaby Jack demonstrated that some
remotely accessible pacemaker models could be hacked and that it was possible for the
delivery of an electric jolt to the person’s heart which could kill them (Boyle, 2012).
Notoriously, U.S. vice president Dick Cheney had prompted the decision to disable the
wireless functionality of the pacemaker for the same reason of the risk of him receiving
a lethal jolt (Vaas, 2013). Although this had occurred during 2001-2009, this is still a
problem that can happen today. While the capability to be able to track the heartbeat
wirelessly is very effective so that patients are monitored, without proper security it
would be ethically incorrect to allow patients to use a pacemaker as it would cause them
harm. This would break the principle of Nonmaleficence that states that physicians
should not cause harm to patients or at the very least the cost of doing something
should outweigh any harm that is done.
However, we can see other security flaws when the pacemaker needs to
communicate with outside sources via some network. Since pacemakers have an
antenna they can send data to physicians remotely so that the physician can monitor
the patient. However, this same functionality of transferring data from the pacemaker
can also be taken advantage of. Around two years ago, two researchers by the name of
Rios and Butts were able to exploit the pacemaker made from the well-known company,
Medtronic. What they found was that an attacker could get remote access to the
pacemakers and be able to modify patients' pacemaker data. (Newman, 2018). The
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Department of Homeland Security had given a statement, after the report of this found
breach of the pacemaker, which entailed: “An attacker with adjacent short-range access
to an affected product, in situations where the product’s radio is turned on, can inject,
replay, modify, and/or intercept data within the telemetry communication,” according to
a statement from the DHS (Curley, 2019)
Ultimately, pacemakers have saved the lives of thousands of people by allowing
physicians to monitor patients with abnormal heartbeats, but it can also open a window
for harm. Determining whether the use of a pacemaker is correct is a hard question
because of the possible dangers that are always present. Hence the only way to allow
the continuance of pacemakers in a way that is secure would be for manufacturing
companies to invest in the making of pacemakers with security features integrated.

MRI & CT Scans
According to the U.S. Food & Drug Association (FDA):
“Medical imaging refers to several different technologies that are used to
view the human body in order to diagnose, monitor, or treat medical
conditions. Each type of technology gives different information about the
area of the body being studied or treated, related to possible disease,
injury, or the effectiveness of medical treatment.”(U.S. Food & Drug
Association, 2018)
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There are a variety of technologies that are able to create medical images, but I
will focus on two very commonly used technologies. MRI machines and CT Scans.
While both do take medical images, the differences lie in the manner that the images
are taken and the visuals that you are able to see in the images. An MRI machine
stands for ‘Magnetic Resonance Imaging’ which means that an MRI uses radio waves
and magnets in order to create an image of bones, tissues, and organs. In comparison
to that of a CT Scan which stands for ‘Computed Tomography’. A CT scan uses x-rays
in order to create multiple ‘cross-sections’ of the human body. CT Scans are used to
look at bones, tissues, the brain, and other organs in the human body. Some common
uses of an MRI are for diagnosing: breast cancer, tumors, joint abnormalities, blood
vessel irregularities, and more. While CT scans are used in order to diagnose:
circulation problems, abdominal abnormalities, urinary bleeding, lung vessels, and more
(Health Images, 2020).
CT and MRI machines are managed through image archiving and are
communicated over a system called PACS. PACS stands for ‘Picture Archiving and
Communication System’. The main components of PACS are core servers that are
responsible for managing the “database, Digital Imaging and Communications in
Medicine (DICOM; gateway), Import/export, radiology information system(RID)
interfacing, storage systems, Web servers, and other interfaces/image distribution
servers” (Heckman and Schultz, 2006). Given that this system is so popular in the
healthcare industry it would have been a given that it would be protected, but in reality,
there are many flaws with the system implementation of PACS.

Ordonez
30

Just this past year, 2019, there was a publication of an experimental new attack
on 3D Medical Imaging which was created just for the purpose of demonstrating that an
attacker can do much more than just hold medical data for ransom. The attack was
conducted on a hospital in order to demonstrate how attackers can gain access to the
hospital network, alter medical imaging, and gain access to other sensitive hospital
data. The attack consisted of a man-in-the-middle attack through the use of a Raspberry
Pi 3B, a small computer, which was given a USB to Ethernet adapter and was
configured without a network identifier. Basically this attack uses the Raspberry Pi as
an intermediary point between a CT Scan and the PACs network to get data before it is
sent from the CT Scan to the network. In addition, the Pi was configured so that the
attackers could use it as a ‘back-door’ to get access to the Wi-Fi network.
The Pi was installed after hours when the cleaning staff was working and it was
installed in a CT scanner room. The Pi was installed between the CT scanner’s
workstation and the PACs network. Meaning that “an attacker could either intercept
scans directly or perform lateral movement through the PACS to other subsystems and
install the malware there” (Mirsky, Mahler, et al., 8) Once they had infiltrated the
network it was discovered that data scanned was passed over the network twice. Once
over a TCP channel, a protocol for data transfer, to an internal web service and then
again to the PACS storage over a TLSv1.2 protocol, a protocol that is designed to
provide communication security over a computer network. However, in both passes, the
information was being transferred in clear text without any encryption added to the
medical images produced by the CT scan. Furthermore, after the attack, the attackers
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were able to obtain both usernames and passwords for over 27 staff members and
doctors because the data being transferred was not encrypted. The reason why the
PACS is not encrypted is because it is not a common practice for hospitals to encrypt
data that is transferred via the PACs network. Some reasons for this are, that there are
compatibility concerns with older technology not being able to handle encrypted data,
and because PACs are not connected to the Internet so it is argued that there would be
no need to encrypt data as it only stays within the hospital network (8).
Thus far this attack has just breached into the network, but this is only the bare
minimum of what the attack is actually able to do. Once the attackers have access to
the 3D Medical Images, through the use of machine learning, they are now able to alter
the images so well that radiologists are being fooled by the fakes. This attack is based
on a neural network called a generative adversarial network, “GAN”. GAN consists of
two neural networks, which are algorithms that take some input to “learn” to perform
some task, which work against each other: the generator and the discriminator. The
generator creates fake samples to try and fool the discriminator while the discriminator
learns to differentiate between real and fake imaging samples. As the discriminator
differentiates the fakes and the real imaging samples, the generator learns how to make
better samples and ultimately create fake imagery that seems authentic. The attack is
called CT-GAN and this attack works by using two GANs. One for the removal of cancer
and one for the insertion of cancer into the 3D Medical Images. The removal GAN is
trained on healthy images, meaning that the patient is healthy and has no cancer,
versus the insertion GAN is trained on unhealthy images, meaning that the patient has
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cancer. For the purpose of this attack, lung cancer was the focus just to test if it would
be possible to alter the images so well that even radiologists would not be able to tell a
difference between the altered images and the unaltered images. There are other
similar attacks but the reason why CT-GAN works better is because of how it takes into
consideration the surrounding components of the image so that there is no obvious or
unnatural insertion of a cancerous node. Other techniques such as copying and pasting
a cancer node create obvious trails of the image being altered. The reason is that the
pasted samples ignore the surrounding anatomy of the image which creates
inconsistent textures in the image (Mirsky, Mahler, et al., 3-4).

Figure 3: CT-GAN attack process. (Mirsky, Mahler, et al., 10)

Figure 3 illustrates the process that CT-GAN takes in order to insert cancer
nodes which is the same process in which the removal of a cancerous node is
accomplished. The process is capturing data, choosing a location to either inject a node
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or remove a node, scaling the image, normalizing the image, masking, injecting/removal
of the node, reverse processing, adding some small details, lastly is pasting the node.
Once these steps are completed then the image is returned back into the network. The
amount of detail that the GAN takes into consideration to make the node seem as
original and natural as possible makes it difficult to see if an image has a fabricated
node. After the attack was conducted on the test hospital, three radiologists were
contacted in order to see if they could be tricked by the CT-GAN Medical Imaging neural
network. The attack itself had an average success rate of 99.2% for cancer injection
images and 95.8% for cancer removal images. Although this attack was only an
experiment, it does bring to light some of the huge dangers in not only the ability to alter
medical imaging with machine learning, but also the lack of security that is present in
hospital networks due to a lack of encryption. The need for better security is essential
as this attack could cause the death of some patients if the radiologists are tricked by an
altered image and announce a patient to be healthy when in reality they had cancer.
(Mirsky, Mahler, et al., 13).

PACS Vulnerabilities
As of September 16, 2019, the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
(NCCoE) has released a draft on analysis of the PACS ecosystem by using a risk
assessment based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and other relevant standards.
The NCCoE created an example of how HDOs, healthcare delivery organization
environments, can use standards-based commercially available cybersecurity
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technologies to better protect the PACS system. The challenges when trying to secure
the PACS system in a hospital is trying to secure the different kinds of interconnected
systems. IoT devices that are used are usually from different vendors and supplies
which means that one technique to secure one device will not work on other devices
because of how different some IoT devices are from each other. Therefore the range of
attacks is very diverse because they can target any IoT devices that are used by
hospitals which means that ultimately a hospital only increases their risk by using a wide
variety of IoT devices (Cawthra, Hodges, et al., 2).

Figure 4: PACS’ Medical Imaging Ecosystem

Figure 4 represents the medical imaging ecosystem in a hospital that uses the
PACS ecosystem. As previously noted, the PACS system has multiple servers
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consisting of a database, DICOM, Web servers, and other interfaces/image distribution
servers. NCCoE provided a list of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that are available
when using a PACS ecosystem such as the one in the image above. NCCoE assessed
the risks of the PACS and medical ecosystem through the use of five scenarios. A
sample radiology practice workflow, image data access across the enterprise,
accessing-monitoring-auditing, imaging object change management, and remote
access. After analyzing each of the scenarios they had created a list of threats that are
possible, a list of vulnerabilities, and also a list of risks that are present in these
systems. Lastly, NCCoE posed a framework to use in order to solve many of these
issues and also a list of technologies that follow security standards such as HIPAA and
IEC. Some of the threats listed were actions such as compromising credentials and
altering data. This includes threats such as an individual levering privileges for
unintended purposes, distortion or alteration of data in transit, or using malicious
malware code which affects the servers and workstations (Cawthra, Hodges, et al., 35).
There are also a number of other vulnerabilities that can be present. In
accordance with the list of vulnerabilities that were presented by NCCoE, most of the
vulnerabilities listed were from lack of awareness or training from the hospital
employees and other users. For example, the workforce not being aware or have not
received proper training needed to use the PACS system correctly. Security teams not
having sufficient training on the proper ways to investigate and write reports on
abnormalities found in the system. As well as users who do have access to the
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networks have more privileges than they should, so the management of authentication
and privileges within the hospitals is not strict (Cawthra, Hodges, et al., 19).
The NCCoE also provided a list of unmitigated risks which can be present in
PACS lab environments. The list of risks included attacks such as a patient
misdiagnosed because of some changes made to medical data by a user who was not
authorized. Such as an attacker performing a CT-GAN attack as presented before.
Another risk is the PACS or other systems within the ecosystem being attacked by
ransomware which renders the systems and data unavailable (Cawthra, Hodges, et al.,
23).
Due to all of these potential risks, the NCCoE mapped out the PACS ecosystem
to the NIST cybersecurity framework. The tables describe many functions such as
identity and protection which correspond to categories such as data security and
information protection processes and procedures. On top of this, the NCCoE also
provided a list of products and technologies which can be used in response to all of the
risks, vulnerabilities, and threats that are present. For example in regards to the DICOM
images, by using products such as Hyland Acuo Vendor Neutral, which provides access
to the medical images and stores and retrieves images, or the use of Hyland NilRead
Enterprise, which provides medical image viewing and manipulating for PACS, it can
make the access of data restricted to only users that are authorized by these
technologies. Meaning that if hospitals that implement the PACS environment were to
use such products, there would be much safer management of user data (Cawthra,
Hodges, et al., 37).
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Software Vulnerabilities
One of the most famous hacks in the world is that of the malware attack called
WannaCry. This cyberattack hit globally and it threw the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service into hiatus. What WannaCry actually did was to infect computers which
would disallow employees to gain access to files unless some ransom money was paid.
If the ransom money was not paid then all of the files on the computer would be deleted.
However, in a healthcare setting, this meant that doctors lost access to millions of
records which are needed to know what's wrong with patients at hospitals. This attack
cost the United Kingdom National Healthcare about ninety-two million pounds because
of about twenty thousand appointments having to be canceled due to the data loss
(Field, 2018). This attack was effective because there was a security flaw in Microsoft’s
computers. Computers that used Windows XP, Windows 8, or Windows Server 2003
were vulnerable to this hack due to an unpatched vulnerability (Epstein, 2017).
What WannaCry does is that once it gets access to a host, it will encrypt most or
even all of the files on the user’s computer and it would ask for ransom money. A red
pop screen will appear on the user’s screen, just like in this image below:
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If the user did not pay the money with bitcoin then it would delete all of the user’s
files that were encrypted and all data will be lost. Now given that this attack managed to
affect the healthcare system in the United Kingdom, it does bring to concern just how
severe this attack was. Since all data could be lost that would mean that all medical
records were lost so basically you have doctors who would have to re-diagnose patients
to regain all of the lost data. Now if a patient was in some critical condition then this
could potentially have meant severe harm or even death. It was never announced that
there was a death caused by this attack but there was a report from the Healthcare
Industry Cybersecurity Task Force convened by the US Department of Health and
Human Services which noted that health care in the United Kingdom was in critical
condition. Experts say that health care lags far behind other industries, like the financial
sector, in the level of protection used on their information. However, unlike finance,

Ordonez
39

health care failure can result in injury or even death.” That is why this attack on the
healthcare system was a massive blow and it just shows how important it is to have
security in healthcare systems (Wetsman, 2019).
The biggest reason why these types of attacks are very successful is due to the
fact that many users do not update their computers. This means that if there is a
vulnerability available in an older update of a computer and a hacker creates a malware
that leverages that vulnerability then they are susceptible to the attack. This is why there
are still many malware attacks and why many cybersecurity analysts work to try and
defend against these attacks. Although the WannaCry attack was a huge problem, it
was an attack that was very obvious once the malware had infected the user’s
computer. However, there are attacks that are not as obvious and are very hard to
detect as they leave no obvious traces such as the big red screen on your display like
the WanaCry attack does. There may be no sign of a breach until a user gets
blackmailed for ransom money, some data gets corrupted, or someone discovers the
vulnerability; which typically happens way after the infection has occurred. A scenario of
this sort is if the attacker has found a back door in a system. Meaning that an attacker
found access to a certain area in a system that they were not meant to have access to.
If the hacker is good enough then they can make it very difficult to track them and a lot
of the times once they have access to some system they move slowly to not catch any
attention.
These quieter attacks include cases such as a hospital lab blood gas analyzer
attack in Europe. These blood gas analyzers, or also known as an arterial blood gas
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test, measure the amounts of arterial gases, such as oxygen and carbon dioxide, that
are present in a patient’s body. This blood gas analyzer is used in situations where the
patient is in critical care. This is needed to determine whether or not the patient’s lungs
are able to distribute oxygen throughout the body and be able to excrete out the carbon
dioxide properly. However, a company called TrapX had discovered that the attackers
were able to move through the networks from a vulnerability found in the blood gas
analyzers which allowed them to get backdoor access to the hospital network. This
meant that the hackers could tamper with the levels being outputted from the machine
which can be very dangerous as wrong numbers could lead to the patient not getting
the proper help needed to distribute oxygen to the body. As well as they had access to
the hospital network which meant that they could get access to patient data. Ultimately,
an attacker does not directly need to attack a hospital network but just find a way to get
access to machines that are connected, in some way, to the network itself and just work
through that chain of connections. (TrapX Labs, 17)
TrapX had concluded that this attack, known as MEDJACK, had the potential to
alter data from the hospital patient data database. There are many other cases of
breaches like these. A preventive measure would be to install firewalls in their networks
to be more protected, but the reality is that not all hospitals do. In fact, there are some
that barely use any security software and are still running very outdated software. It is
also the case that some Healthcare IT teams do not have access to the internal
software in medical devices and so the only protection that they get is whatever, if any,
protection pre-installed onto the device when first acquired. This is very alarming given
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the fact that if IT is not able to support and have access to the network then it might as
well just be as if they were not even there in the first place (Storm, 2015).
The reliance on the software that comes with certain medical devices is not
always a smart decision because they can become utterly useless against attacks if
they are not consistently being updated and patched against certain vulnerabilities that
are discovered in these devices. TrapX had also explained how “medical devices are
‘closed devices, running out-of-date, closed, oftentimes modified and likely insecure
operating systems such as Windows 2000, Windows XP” (Storm, 2015). This can
become rather serious as technology is always advancing so there will be smarter ways
to gain access to data and networks that these attackers should not have access to.
This same idea of functionality and user-friendliness over security is becoming more
and more apparent as many healthcare institutions simply use what software or
hardware they know best as it is more convenient than to change to better secured.

Social Engineering
Thus far we have talked about attackers being able to do a range of things such
as accessing hospital networks to being able to manipulate medical imaging. While
altering medical images is a very sophisticated and complex attack that requires an
attacker to have a tremendous amount of knowledge in not only artificial intelligence but
also some medicine to accurately alter medical images that will deceive radiologists.
Now we should also consider other less complex strategies or forms of attack that are
not just easier to conduct but is also the leading form of attacks. These attacks are
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under the scope of social engineering. Social Engineering is the psychological
manipulation of people into performing certain actions or giving away confidential data.
In accordance with the US Department of Justice, social engineering attacks are one of
the most dangerous threats in the world. The reason why these attacks are so
successful is that the attackers are able to exploit the “natural human tendency to trust.”
Humans are more likely to trust other humans than other technology which means that if
an attacker is successful in gaining the trust of someone then that would mean that it is
more likely for them to get some information/the attack being successful (Fatima and
Kaabouch, 1).
Under the scope of social engineering, there are many ways that someone can
conduct such an attack. For example, such attacks include phishing, ransomware,
online social engineering, and many more. In 2018 there was an attack on a company
called Equifax. Equifax is a company that is a credit reporting and monitoring agency
that collects data from individuals and businesses to monitor their credit history and to
prevent fraud. That being said, Equifax had access to a lot of sensitive user data such
as social security numbers, credit card numbers, driver licenses, and other data. There
was a phishing email that was sent to Equifax. The email was pretending to be from
financial institutions and other big banks such as Bank Of America. Given that the email
seemed realistic and passed as an email that they would usually receive, they fell into
the trap of the phishing email. This resulted in the loss of about 145.4 million American
customers’ sensitive data. Even today there is always news about phishing emails being
sent around or robocalls trying to get information from people. Yet, although these
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attacks are becoming so common, why are people still being tricked? To answer this we
should first look into the specifics of these attacks and also look into some other forms
of social engineering that are not so common. We can then begin to analyze them as a
whole and uncover that within all of these there is a commonality in the way that they
are executed. ( Fatima and Kaabouch, 2)
The most common social engineering attack is known as a phishing attack.
However what is not commonly known is that within phishing attacks there are some
classifications of this attack such as spear phishing, whale phishing, vising phishing,
interactive voice response phishing, and business email compromise phishing.
Beginning with spear phishing, this refers to specific individuals or selected groups
using their names to make claims or communication. This requires the collection of info
about the victim by using online sources such as looking at the victim’s social media to
get an idea of what kind of person they are. Whale phishing is spear phishing, but it
targets higher ranking people from companies which are called big fishes. Hence the
attack was named whale phishing. Vishing attacks are attacks done over the phone in
order to manipulate people to give their sensitive info for verification. For example, this
could be a call from an insurance company asking for your information to check
something with your account. Lastly, there is also business email compromise phishing
where attackers will use emails to trick employees, from some company, to click on a
link or to download an email attachment to compromise the company’s network. While
these are a couple of very effective attacks, there are many other forms that also fall
under the umbrella of social engineering. However even with just phishing attacks, we
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can begin to see that there is a common pattern in these attacks. This being that there
is some research being done on the target before an attack is done (Fatima and
Kaabouch, 5).
Social Engineering attacks are usually composed of the collecting information
stage, developing a relationship with some target, exploiting the available info,
executing some attack, and lastly exiting without any trace of the attack has occurred.
There is certain terminology that some cybersecurity analysts use such as
research/reconnaissance, hook, play, and out. However, we can also categorize the
attacks into three groups, “social, technical, and physical-based attacks.” Phishing
attacks are in the category of social. Other attacks that are also within the context of
social attacks are pretexting attacks, phone/email scams, and robocalls. These
techniques are grounded on the emotional aspects of humans and also the fact that
humans are more likely to make mistakes and trust others. Within the other categories
of technical and physical-based attacks, while these attacks are a bit harder to execute,
they can be just as affected and in some cases even more effective. (Fatima and
Kaabouch, 2)
The technical attacks such as ransomware attacks, pop-up attacks, and baiting
attacks, are a bit harder to implement but are definitely doable with the right knowledge
and skills. Ransomware attacks are attacks that target both individuals and companies.
An affected company can suffer for very long if the ransomware successfully attacks the
companies. Ransomware attacks have the power to restrict and block access to data
such as files on a victim's computer by encrypting those files. In order to recover the
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files, the victim is threatened to pay some ransom. Meaning that if the attack is
successful, the company has a high probability of losing either their user’s information
or money from having to pay the ransom. However, the process for developing such an
attack is much more complex as the attackers have to be able to create the malicious
code that will take all files from a system and then encrypt the files through the use of
some encryption algorithm. Baiting attacks lure users to perform some actions such as
clicking on some link to get some reward or leaving some USB drive at a coffee shop to
lure someone to insert it into their computer. They act like a trojan horse where on the
outside there is a clear benefit in doing some action, but in reality, it is a way to take
advantage of the user by passing malicious codes onto the user’s computer. Pop-up
window attacks are attacks when a window appears on the victim’s screen informing
that the connection to the network has been lost and the user is then prompted to
re-enter their credential to regain connection. This pop-up window, of course, being a
fake, takes the re-inputted credentials and then sends them to some foreign location
where the attackers then have credentials to be able to get access to the network
(Fatima and Kaabouch, 7)
When we had previously looked at the other forms of attacks in previous sections
such as hacking into pacemakers or altering medical imaging, a lot of the prevention
techniques/countermeasures were solely on technological improvements or integrating
better systems that provide more security measures. However, for many of the security
measures or prevention strategies that are useful for social engineering attacks, they
revolve around the human aspect. Meaning that employees need to be trained so that
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they are not so easily susceptible to these types of attacks. There are many prevention
techniques that can be very helpful for both employees and companies as a whole such
as encouraging security education and training. By doing so, it can increase the
awareness of these social attacks which can keep employees on the lookout when they
see some suspicious activity. As well as training on how to manage the company's data
so their user’s confidentiality can be ensured. While it may seem that this is such a
small change to prevent such destructive attacks, since these attacks rely so heavily on
human error, the success rate for these attacks can drop drastically if people are aware
of these attacks. Since not many people are aware or not expecting such an attack to
happen to them, it is rather hard to be alert and very easy for someone to not realize
that they are a victim. Thus by having security awareness classes, it can bring the
employees alert level to a point where they can at least prevent some less elaborate
social engineering attacks such as downloading a suspicious file from an email
attachment (Fatima and Kaabouch, 8).
There are also some mitigation techniques that companies can use to combat a
lot of attacks. Human-based mitigation attacks, just like prevention techniques, are very
important to mitigate many of the social engineering attacks or at least to lessen the
amount of damage that an attacker can do. However, as we have noted, the human
component is not the most secure manner of security because this required strong
awareness of social engineering attacks and if the human is not able to detect them
then there is nothing that the human can do in response to an attack. Hence there are
some technological-based mitigation techniques that can improve the accuracy of
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human-based mitigations against attacks. In accordance with a publication “Social
Engineering Attacks: A Survey”, Salahdine and Kaabouch entail that there are four
technology-based mitigation techniques which are biometrics, sensors, AI, and social
honeypot. A biometric mitigation technique’s purpose is to counteract physical attacks,
which are attacks in which the attacker does hands-on work such as sneaking into a
company, caused by attackers trying to impersonate a company employee by creating a
fake profile. Sensor-based mitigations are used in order to identify individuals. This
could be an ID badge that the employee must have in order to get into the premises of
their company. AI can be very useful to incorporate into a company because they are
able to learn and adapt which means that they can become better defenders for these
attacks over time. Lastly, social honeypot is a computer or computer system intended to
mimic likely targets of cyberattacks. It can be used to detect attacks or deflect them
from a legitimate target. It can also be used to gain information about how the
cybercriminals operate” (NortonLifeLock, 2020).
One of the hardest attacks to combat is ransomware. As previously stated, these
attacks target individuals and companies rather than certain technology which makes it
harder to notice them. In the survey, Salahdine and Kaabouch proposed an early
warning detection system that is able to alert the employees when there is any
suspicious activity on user data. The name of this system is CryptoDrop which analyses
many common behavior indicators for ransomware attacks. In addition, they proposed a
set of steps to take when mitigating and handling the ransomware attacks. The steps
are preparation, detection, containment, eradication, and lastly recovery. In the
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preparation step, the company’s security team must eliminate all the vulnerabilities so
that there is no other access point from where an attacker can attack again. In the
detection step, with the use of tools integrated into the intrusion detection system (IDS)
such as CryptoWall and Locky, a ransomware attack can be detected. In the
containment step, the security team is to aim at containing the attack to only a few of
the company devices in order to contain the amount of data access that an attacker
has. In the eradication step, this involves the cleaning of any damage caused by the
ransomware attack. Lastly, in the recovery step, this is the recovery of damaged or lost
files that are restored from the company’s backups after making sure to dispose of the
systems and machines (Fatima and Kaabouch, 11).
Social engineering attacks are by far more successful than other attacks and
therefore should be a sector in cybersecurity that needs to be addressed more. This
means that there needs to be more teaching about such attacks to the public so that
they can be prepared and be less likely to be victims. As the human factor is the most
vulnerable aspect for social engineering and hacking in general, training and awareness
of both social engineering and cybersecurity should be broadcasted so that the general
public can be aware. In the long run, as more individuals are aware and are
experienced with these attacks, the vulnerability level for social engineering will lessen
and ultimately reduce the number of attacks caused by social engineering.

Discussion & Conclusion
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Ultimately there are many techniques that can be used in order to both prevent
certain attacks and also to mitigate them once they have attacked. However, the
vulnerability level is much higher when users of companies are not aware of the
possibilities of hacking occurring. While hacking is known around the world, it is very
easy to dismiss the possibilities as the chances of someone becoming a victim is low.
However, when looking at the level of severity imposed from being a victim of an attack
such as a shock to the heart from a pacemaker, personal information being stolen, and
many other vectors of hacking, it is clear that hacking attacks are very dangerous.
Even with the addition of some preventive measures that were introduced in
previous sections, that does not guarantee people’s safety if manufacturing companies
and hospitals do not begin to implement similar techniques to ensure the security of
their services. As addressed before, ethically speaking the use of many of these
devices and services is questionable, but the fact is that people rely on such things to
live. Therefore preemptive measures need to be taken by imposing better-secured
systems, using newer technology, and learning about the risks of such attacks to not
only keep systems protected but also keep the general public safe.

Future Enhancements
Given the time frame of this research, there were time constraints and limits to
the number of topics that could be covered within the field of cybersecurity. If given a
bigger time frame, I would have liked to cover other topics such as the recent creation of
spectra devices. This new technology can bring medical imaging to the patient’s home
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for a low cost of three hundred fifty dollars for a starter set which is much cheaper than
the price to get medical imaging done at a hospital; especially for those without any
medical insurance to cover some of the costs. While this does seem like an amazing
idea to provide such devices so that more of the general public could get their medical
images done and be able to report them to their doctors, I do question its security. On
the one hand, when looking back at the vulnerability we had seen with the network in
hospitals and hacking into medical images, given that these devices are used in remote
areas, it would be much harder for an attacker to be able to gain access to a patient’s
images because it is not certain who would have it or not. However given the fact that
this device is going to be accessible to the general public, it would still only be a certain
handful of people who would be able to purchase one. Either way, there is no way of
knowing if a customer of the spectra devices is a hacker or not. If an attacker does
purchase a Spectra, it is possible that the attacker could study the device and learn how
medical imaging works and be able to use techniques such as CT-GAN, a technique to
alter medical imaging. If they can acquire such a skill then that could cause grave
danger to patients if their images were to get altered as described in the MRI/CT Scans
section of this research paper (Rintoul, 2020).
As well as the attacks that have continued to occur now amidst the COVID-19
pandemic. With the pandemic placing a lot of fear onto the public, criminals have also
noticed their fears and have begun to take advantage of it. There have been many
social engineering attacks attempting to “impersonate legitimate organizations, such as
the Center for Disease Control or the World Health Organization, by offering fake
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informational updates and even promises of access to vaccines - all for a price, of
course!” This statement was from CSO Online which provides the latest information on
cybersecurity issues and provides information about best practices to follow. As
previously covered in the Social Engineering section, these forms of attacks target the
human emotions and by getting the trust of the public they can get information from
them. While being in a situation of fear and uncertainty, the human is vulnerable through
emotional stress and it can be easier to lure people into giving information for the return
of some service. In the case of COVID-19 given that there are many people who are
dying, people would want to know that they are safe, and getting access to a vaccine
that could save them would be of great interest (Tarun, 2020).
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